The POLITICS of SPIRITUALITY

Analyzing the Reunification of the Russian Orthodox Church

By Natasha Goldvug

Unbeknownst to most New Yorkers, the Upper East Side plays host to a conflict of religion and politics which has spanned decades. The St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church and the Synod’s Cathedral of the Mother of God of the Sign, a parish of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, are situated a mere five blocks apart. The two provide similar liturgical prayers and services, propagate the same ideologies, and utilize comparable hierarchical structures. Indeed, prior to the Russian Revolution there was only the Mother Russian Orthodox Church. The split between the two came with the fall of the Romanovs and the triumph of communism. After nearly ninety years of political strife, the two churches are now negotiating a reciprocal peace. 

The Revolution of 1917 changed the role of the Russian Orthodox Church. Saint Tikhon of Moscow was named Patriarch, or head of the Russian Orthodox Church, just two days before the outbreak of the revolution. Before this, Tikhon served as the head of the Russian Orthodox Church in America. The communists’ rise to power meant the establishment of an atheist state and an attempt to destroy the Russian Orthodox Church. Approximately 35,000 clergymen were executed or imprisoned, and its finest intellects fled westward to England, France, Germany and the United States, among other nations. The surviving bishops were viewed as collaborators. In the 1920s, Tikhon allowed Soviet exiles to establish an independent governing body, known in the Eastern Orthodox Churches as a Synods of Bishops, and ÈmigrÈ Russians who opposed the revolution founded the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia.

The schism between the two sects came about because of political rather than spiritual reasons, and many congregants today do not differentiate between the two churches. Beginning in the 1990s, talks of reunification were encouraged by President Vladimir Putin, who met on several occasions with leaders from both churches. While the churches may have succeeded in what Dr. John Anthony McGuckin, a professor at the Union Theological Seminary, calls “laying down the nightmare of Uncle Joe Stalin,” negotiations are still under way, and peace between the two sects is far from certain. According to both sides, the aim of the talks has been to establish a spiritual bond and a Eucharistic communion between the two churches. As McGukin said, “To be Orthodox means to be in communion,” or to have a spiritual relationship with other Christians.

In addition to this spiritual factor, the union has other possible ramifications. Hiermonk Joseph Krioukov, spokesperson for the Russian Orthodox Church’s United States parishes, suggests that communion between the two churches would unite thousands of parishes and influence dialogues with the Greek, Serb, and Croat Orthodox Churches. 

In 2000, the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow conceded to the validity of other churches and outlined the proper relationship between church and state, stressing cooperation rather than intrusion. The Russian Orthodox Church also canonized new martyrs, primarily the Romanov family. The Church Abroad canonized Czar Nicholas II, his wife Empress Alexandra, and their five children in 1981. This was a major point of contention between the churches, as many bishops in Russia considered the royal family to be martyrs of the counter-revolution rather than of religion. Now that both churches have canonized the Romanovs, the two sects have reached some common ground.

Nonetheless, negotiations have proceeded within the context of an older legacy of mistrust, primarily on the part of members of the Church Abroad. Because people who were persecuted by the Soviets established the Church Abroad, many congregants are still unwilling to lay aside their resentment of the Russian Orthodox Church, which they see as complicit in the atrocities of communism. The Russian Orthodox Church was disbanded in the 1920s and was only revived by Stalin during the World War II to placate, unify, and comfort the people. The result was that many thousands of exiles assumed that this revival meant that they could return to Russia and practice their faith openly. Upon their return, they were imprisoned for treason.

Another reason for distrust was the Moscow Patriarchate’s overt involvement with the KGB. The Communist Party virtually controlled many members of the church leadership and the Orthodox Church’s leaders had to be approved by the KGB before they were consecrated. The current Patriarch of the Orthodox Church in Moscow, Alexy II, had a code name registered with the KGB, as did his predecessors. Members of the Church Abroad argue that they cannot cooperate with those who worked alongside the KGB. Nevertheless, leadership in the Church Abroad tries to downplay this particular antagonism. According to Nicholas Ohotin, Communications Director of the Synod of Bishops of the Church Abroad, “Anywhere from 80 to 90 percent of the bishops in the current [Russian Orthodox] Church were consecrated after the fall of communism.”  

Congregants of the Church Abroad also worry that the Moscow Patriarchate will seize properties, sacred possessions, and money, but Ohotin describes these as largely unrealistic fears.  He says that “the rule of law safeguards [the Church’s property] in 99 percent of the nations” in which it has parishes. Moreover, Father Joseph of the Russian Orthodox Church said, “The Abroad Church has nothing specific that the Russian Church wants; nor is it looking to acquire valuable possessions.” Neither Ohotin nor Father Joseph is a staunch opponent of reunification.

Despite such steps of progress, new sources of conflict have also surfaced. In 1997, Patriarch Alexy II asked former head of the Palestinian Authority Yasser Arafat to help the Russian Orthodox Church recover properties it had lost as a result of the revolution. Weeks later, Arafat’s troops seized a monastery owned by the Church Abroad in Hebron, a city in the West Bank under Palestinian control. Three years later, Arafat did the same in Jericho, another Palestinian city. In this case, members from the Russian Consulate stood by while militants expelled and physically abused clergy from the Church Abroad. During the conflict, Alexy II wrote a letter to then US President Bill Clinton, in which he expressed his displeasure with the US’s condemnation of the seizure. According to Alexy II, the property in question “historically” belonged to Russia.

“The seizure of the monasteries in Jericho and Hebron through the use of force on the part of the Palestinian Administration under Yassir Arafat was viewed in the Holy Land as a violation of the status quo of holy sites in Palestine,” said Ohotin in a recent statement. Thus, there is resistance toward unification within the Church Abroad. 

According to McGuckin, the deep-seated traditions of the past explain the current relationship between the two churches. The Russian Orthodox Church must be considered not in terms of years or decades, but in terms of centuries and millennia. The church, he argues, retains influences dating as far back as the second century, and the present political climate must be seen within the context of the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine model relies heavily on Old Testament archetypes both religiously and spiritually, centering on “one empire, one ruler, one church.” Such a model is still present in the minds of many adherents.

Much has also been made of President Putin’s interest in the reunification of the Russian Orthodox Church. Putin has made a point of meeting with representatives of both sects and has encouraged dialogue. Both Ohotin and Father Joseph attribute this to a genuine faith. “Putin does not wish to enforce any personal opinions in the process of reunification,” said Father Joseph. The reunification, however, would also be a great political triumph for Putin and, as McGukin pointed out, “a happy healing of a very traumatic event.” By unifying the divide within the church, Putin can symbolically rewrite the history and memory of communism. Unification would recreate the vision of the Russian Empire--a vision which has always been inseparable from the Orthodox Church--and would strengthen what many consider a ‘fallen’ nation. Both sides argue that any changes sought in these negotiations will be spiritual in nature, rather than political or administrative, because, as Father Joseph said, “The Church cares for every individual.” Ohotin, in turn, looks forward to a confederacy between the churches. According to Ohotin, divisions over heresy and politics have for a long time characterized the history of the Orthodox Church. “To overcome these divisions,” Ohotin explained, “means to make peace.”